

6/18/2001

OFFICE OF THE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of Defense

From: Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, CGUSAREUR

Subject: Answers to SecDef "23 Questions"

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Bill Owen
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Sir,

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Thank you for the opportunity to offer some input. These views stem from spending five of the last six years in command in the field, two of them in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. I suspect that the perspective from these trenches may differ from those you receive from inside the Beltway, but the tension may be useful.

1. Key paragraph "Core Capabilities" revised:

US armed Forces must shape the security environment in support of US interests, counter threats to the homeland, and respond to regional crises that threaten our vital interests either directly or indirectly. Concurrently, our forces must deter adversaries from escalating crises to a war. Deterrence requires ready forces, demonstrated capability across the spectrum of conflict and avoidance of the potential for operational and strategic surprise. When deterrence fails, we must preempt escalation of the conflict into a multi-theater war and defeat the original opponent and any successors by destroying their forces and their means of supporting them wherever they exist in a way that collapses the will of their political leadership and sets the conditions for peace.

2. Sample Strategy Paper:

This "Sample Strategy" is pretty thin gruel. It does not address the critical tension between strategic objectives, available funding, and risk. I think General Ralston had it about right when he recommended that we must look sequentially in priority at what we want our military to do in terms of strategic tasks and available resources. Work

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dollars in stock funds and other capital accounts that lurk under the tip of Service and DOD icebergs dwarf the monies we use for the operating forces.

19. Interoperability and standardization:

This process may be easier functionally than it seems. The solution lies in open architectures for C4ISR with agreed upon protocols for transfer of data, message formats for instance. It lies in agreement in DII-COE rules for C4ISR systems across national boundaries. Politically, this kind of discipline will be tough, since firms in different nations will generate political pressure to have proprietary systems and protocols that ensure those firms have a long term lock on providing that nation's command and control equipment.

In addition we must conduct exercises with our Allies to ensure we mutually understand operating procedures. As in our own Joint operations, we cannot invent these procedures in a crisis. Nor can we instill the confidence across national military cultures that ensures smooth multinational operations in the face of operational risk unless we practice in peacetime. In the final analysis the major leaps in warfighting capability now being enabled by technology lie in the realm of C4ISR, not in new platforms. Interoperability then becomes a function of the fungibility in real time of operational data in our systems for situational awareness and an understanding and familiarity of the procedures we need to work together in the field.

20. Intelligence:

The thrust of our national intelligence effort now seems to focus on space linked systems and connectivity from sanctuary to commanders in the field. This capital infrastructure is a crucial backbone of the strategic component of intelligence. But it is only part of the capability we must build to support commanders at the operational level, the JTF and CJTF commanders who will actually conduct our

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campaigns in the field. In SFOR in normal peacekeeping operations and in special operations, we frequently made our moves without adequate intelligence support. We found that intelligence fusion done forward was usually more relevant and timely than that done in sanctuary.

In today's operational environment Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment used by our adversaries exploits Moore's Law in a way that our five to ten year procurement cycles do not. In the Republika Srbska, for instance, the new innovative microwave backbone they began constructing in '98 is now being replaced by a much more capable and secure fiber backbone. In addition they are exploiting, as are the Kosovar's, the usefulness of cell phones in a way that we have not countered. In defense intelligence in support of commanders in the field, we must adopt the ability continuously to template the changing electromagnetic spectrum and to use rapid prototyping to keep up with the changes our opponents are making by exploiting COTS.

In addition our HUMINT effort is wanting. Granted the Former Yugoslavia poses a particular challenge in that it was a region of low priority all during the Cold War. It takes time to build HUMINT networks. But in 97 - 98, several years after we became interested in the region, routinely in SFOR we received our best HUMINT from Special Operations elements or Army Counter Intelligence personnel. National Agencies in our area of operations were usually amateurish and not very capable and had questionable tradecraft. It may be that this level of capability was a function of national priorities, and that more capable assets were employed on other tasks. But if we are going to play in the "Anywhere...Anytime" business, we had best address this problem. Improving DOD capabilities to fill in operational needs placed on low priority by national intelligence agencies must be part of the solution.

In addition, field commanders have a difficult time tailoring the teams of expertise needed in this new operational environment. In Bosnia and Kosovo, and I suspect in most

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contingency operations, along with traditional military capability the nature of the intelligence challenge requires skills normally used against organized crime. To keep our commanders from fighting with only one eye open, DOD should negotiate the agreements that allow us when needed to include in our National Intelligence Support Teams experts from the FBI, Customs, and DEA.

21. Ms Flournoy's Alternatives:

Given the comment in paragraph 2 above, I'm not sure these alternatives are relevant until we walk through the derivation of essential strategic tasks and the allocation of the risk of failure we are willing to assign to each. Only then can we understand how to allocate the limited funds we can expect for defense from OMB and the legislature. But justifying an abstract strategic statement not tied to a sense of acceptable risk and likely funding levels, seems like a pretty sterile exercise.

23. No new questions, just a summary:

In summary, three things seem to stand out. The first is how to garner the investments to ensure dominance in space-based capability and the development of the capabilities for missile defense and for preemption of employment of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations.

The real source of discretionary income to be reaped for this effort and modernization of Service capabilities lies in the streamlining of DOD infrastructure and new efficiencies in its operation. This process means a BRAC and application of business standards across all of our industrial processes in DOD. Additional savings in the form of cost avoidance can be reaped in the Services if incentives are created allowing commanders to keep a portion of the savings and plough them back into Quality of Life, RPM, and MILCON.